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The President's Daily Brief

November 5, 1976

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~~*Top Secret*~~ 25X1

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MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA:
The Machel government has reacted with restraint to attacks this week by Rhodesian security forces on guerrilla bases in Mozambique, apparently in an effort to avoid action that might damage chances for agreement in Geneva.

Foreign Minister Chissano on Wednesday expressed concern over the situation to the diplomatic corps but did not appeal for military assistance, as Mozambique had done after earlier Rhodesian attacks.

Chissano met separately with the US ambassador and asserted that such raids are bound to "complicate" the negotiations in Geneva. He said he hoped the US would make that point to Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith.

Concern over the Rhodesian attacks apparently has led Machel to ask for a meeting of the "front-line" African presidents. Tanzanian President Nyerere and Zambian President Kaunda have agreed to meet with Machel on Saturday in Dar es Salaam. Angolan President Neto also is to be invited; Botswanan President Khama apparently will not attend. 25X1

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press reports the Rhodesian operations covered a wider area than past attacks in Mozambique, and that the security forces captured or destroyed large quantities of arms and equipment.

The Rhodesians penetrated up to 60 kilometers (38 miles) into Mozambique along a front stretching some 240 kilometers (150 miles). They say special precautions were taken to avoid civilians and Mozambican troops.

* * *

JAPAN: *Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda's resignation today--reflecting his decision to move into open opposition to Prime Minister Miki--virtually ensures that the anti-Miki camp will make a serious effort to oust the Prime Minister following the lower house election next month.*

Fukuda had been under considerable pressure to resign since last week. Then nearly two-thirds of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Diet members publicly endorsed Miki's removal--and Fukuda's installation as party president and prime minister. Anti-Miki leaders agreed to postpone such a direct challenge for the time being, however, because of sentiment in the party that the leadership issue should be resolved after the lower house election.

Fukuda has preferred all along that Miki be removed by negotiation rather than an open battle, and his refusal to confront the Prime Minister has caused problems in the anti-Miki ranks. At this point, however, Fukuda has little to lose by resigning.

The Diet has passed the required economic legislation this session--in part Fukuda's responsibility as director of the economic planning agency, from which he has also resigned--and in any case the entire cabinet must by law resign following the general election.

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POLAND-USSR: *Polish party leader Gierek will visit the Soviet Union for one week beginning November 9.*

The Poles need Soviet economic assistance, and the Soviets will use the trip to show the extent of their support for the current Polish leadership. Despite concern about Polish economic practices and the way in which the price increases in June were handled, Moscow has apparently decided to throw its weight behind Gierek. To do otherwise would risk further political instability in Poland.

Tensions within Poland remain high.

In late October, eight Western ambassadors in Warsaw in an assessment of the Polish domestic situation since the June riots said that the current "crisis" is more serious than the crises of 1956 and 1970 because:

--there is no visible alternative to the present leadership;

--there is a strong--even bitter--rejection of the regime by a broad, informal opposition, which embraces industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals, university students, the church, and reformist communists;

--the government is at an impasse and has failed to develop new policies.

The most dangerous time in the near term will come in the weeks before Christmas, when the Polish people traditionally stock up on food and other goods. The government normally reserves sufficient quantities of meat for the occasion and is expected to try to do the same this year.

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

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USSR: *The MIRV-equipped SS-18 ICBM may now be operational. This version of the SS-18 is the Soviet's largest MIRV missile and has been tested with as many as 10 re-entry vehicles.*

The Soviets appear to have completed the conversion of two more groups of SS-9 silos for the SS-18. Each of these groups contains six silos; at one location the Soviets late last year apparently began stockpiling warheads used with MIRV systems. No warhead canisters of any type have been observed at the location of the other group.

The Soviets now have 48 operational SS-18 launchers and are working on 86 more. The conversion program probably will be completed in 1980, giving them 308 operational SS-18 launchers. Most of these launchers will probably be equipped with the MIRV version of the SS-18.

The MIRV-equipped SS-18 has been tested with varying numbers of re-entry vehicles. On most of its early test flights it carried eight re-entry vehicles--four large and four small. Since mid-1975 most of the missiles have carried 10 of the smaller re-entry vehicles. Both the eight- and ten-re-entry vehicle types have been tested extensively, suggesting that both will be fielded.

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NOTES

Lebanese *President Sarkis has named one of his closest advisers to be the commander of the Arab League peace-keeping force.*

The announcement of Colonel Ahmad al-Haj's appointment gave no new information on when additional peace-keeping troops will arrive in Lebanon or how they will be deployed.

Rival Lebanese factions in Beirut have been regularly violating the cease-fire during the past 48 hours; however, the truce is holding in all other parts of the country.

* * *

Soviet *Foreign Minister Gromyko and* Egyptian *Foreign Minister Fahmi agreed to continue discussions on bilateral issues following their talks Wednesday and yesterday in Sofia, Bulgaria.*

The decision to continue talking is all that can be expected at this stage of the Soviet-Egyptian impasse.

The next opportunities for such exchanges will be when a Soviet trade delegation arrives in Cairo later this month and a Soviet official at the UN goes to Egypt for talks in December. 25X1

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Philippines 25X1

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Renegotiation of the US military bases agreement began last April 25X1 at the Philippines' request.

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Agreement was reached on some points, but when the talks were informally recessed in mid-August, major issues were left unresolved.

A basic problem is the amount of military aid the Philippines wants in return for continued US use of the bases. Another is Manila's request for increased controls over the US bases. Marcos has admitted that the Philippines has devised no formula for Philippine sovereignty over the bases without impinging on US military operations.

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